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DOES THE END JUSTIFY THE MEANS? THE
CLUMSY AND CIRCUITOUS LOGIC OF BLOOD TEST
ADMISSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS IN
STATE V. CORMIER
Kyle T. MacDonald*

I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Cormier,1 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court,
was asked to determine whether a Maine statute2 requiring law enforcement officers
to test the blood of all drivers for intoxicants following a fatal motor vehicle collision
violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution3 when the operation
of the statute allows for the admission of those blood test results in a future criminal
trial of the driver.4 In determining that the procedures of title 29-A, section 2522 of
the Maine Revised Statutes are not violative of the Fourth Amendment, the Law Court
effectively confirmed that the State’s interest in obtaining information regarding the
intoxication of drivers in fatal collisions5 without a warrant outweighs the privacy
interest of the individual. Further, the Law Court established that those test results are
certainly admissible in a criminal proceeding against a driver when the State
demonstrates that either before, during, or after the administration of the mandatory
blood test, information came to light to establish probable cause that the operator
involved in the accident was intoxicated.6 As a result, the Cormier court concluded
that section 2522 survives constitutional scrutiny.7
This case required the Law Court to squarely apply its Fourth Amendment search
and seizure jurisprudence to Maine’s professedly “unique”8 statute for the first time.9
In so doing, the Law Court was forced to wrestle with the contours of the power of law
enforcement personnel to conduct individual searches within the bounds of

* J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Maine School of Law. The author thanks her family for their
constant support and Professor Melvyn Zarr for his invaluable guidance.
1. 2007 ME 112, 928 A.2d 753.
2. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2522(1)-(2) (1996 & Supp. 2003).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . .”).
4. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2522(3).
5. Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶ 25, 928 A.2d. at 761.
6. Id.
7. Id. ¶ 37, 928 A.2d at 763.
8. Id. ¶ 16, 928 A.2d at 758.
9. The Law Court was asked to apply its Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence to
section 2522 for the first time following the Supreme Court’s decision in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67 (2001), which refined the application of the special needs exception to the probable cause and
warrant requirements. The Law Court had previously upheld the constitutionality of section 2522's
predecessor, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312 (Supp. 1992), in State v. Roche, 681 A.2d 472 (Me.
1996).
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constitutional purposes. The primary reasoning articulated by the majority in reaching
this determination was that if the statutory requirements of the probable cause
determination were met, the “built-[in]”10 protections of Maine’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence would preclude such a search from being unreasonable.11 The majority
found further support for the constitutionality of section 2522 by reasoning that the
State’s interest and “special needs,” separate from the general purpose of law
enforcement, justify an exception to the warrant requirement.12 Conversely, the dissent
asserted that the majority had flatly circumvented constitutionality by allowing for
“after-the-fact” evidence to establish probable cause and, in so doing, effectively
sanctioned an unwarranted intrusion on individual privacy.13 Thus, a new question
emerges: By authorizing warrantless, suspicionless, and nonconsensual searches and
seizures of blood following fatal vehicular accidents on the basis of state data
collection and after-acquired probable cause evidence, did the Law Court apply the
best possible logic to reach its conclusion?
This Note first examines the framework of both federal and state Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, with specific attention given to the carved-out “special
needs” exception to the warrant requirement. Part II will also discuss the road to
Cormier in the Maine courts. Part III outlines the statutory history and legislative
intent surrounding the promulgation of section 2522 and briefly explores the rationale
underlying its creation. Part IV will discuss the facts and arguments before the Law
Court in Cormier and the subsequent majority and dissenting opinions. Arguing that
the Law Court erred when it sustained the constitutionality of section 2522 on the
grounds that it did, Part V of this Note will address the consequences of Cormier and
how the legislature should amend section 2522 to avoid future constitutional challenges
while preserving the legislature’s intent to protect Maine drivers and to collect data to
further that purpose. Next, this Note argues that the result of the majority could be
defensible on other “less clumsy” grounds, and questions why the Law Court took such
strenuous yet logically faulty measures to reach its chosen result. Finally, this Note
asserts a dual conclusion. First, the faulty reasoning of the Cormier court has allowed
Maine to slide into unconstitutional territory where probable cause merely plays an
inferior role to the State’s true interest in collecting evidence to be used in criminal
prosecutions for drunk driving-related crimes. Second, the State arguably does have
a heightened interest in the public at large by ascribing fault to drunk drivers, which
outweighs individual privacy. However, the majority blundered when it failed to
execute the most effective reasoning possible.

10.
11.
12.
13.

Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶ 27, 928 A.2d. at 761
Id.
Id. ¶ 36, 928 A.2d at 763.
Id. ¶¶ 57, 59, 928 A.2d at 769 (Levy, J., dissenting).
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II. AN EXAMINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE FOURTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. Search and Seizure
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution14 and article I, section
5 of the Maine Constitution15 were both designed to protect individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, houses, papers, and possessions.
The phrase “search and seizure” is one of the most recognizable clauses in the United
States Constitution. Rather than a blackletter rule of a law, however, the phrase is
considered more an expression of a philosophy crafted in reaction to harsh British
procedures prior to the Revolution.16 The clause was written into the Constitution by
its drafters who hoped to assure that the State would always respect the “sanctity of the
people and the effects they hold dear.”17
To determine the reasonableness of a search, the United States Supreme Court
formulated a test that balances the level of intrusion against the degree that the search
promotes legitimate government interests.18 Traditionally, a search was considered
reasonable if it was executed pursuant to a search warrant that was issued by an independent magistrate upon a showing of probable cause.19 This warrant procedure was
espoused because it allows a disinterested person whose judgment is not swayed by
competing law enforcement goals to make the critical decision of whether there is
probable cause to search.20 At the least, a valid warrant declares that there is an acceptable reason for intrusion into one’s privacy, because a disinterested party made a
determination that there was probable cause for the intrusion. The purpose of requiring
a search warrant and probable cause is to guarantee a substantial probability that the
invasions involved in the search will be justified by the discovery of incriminating
evidence.21 As such, warrant requirements are excused only for important and
recognized exceptions developed through state and federal case law.
B. The Special Needs Exception: A Trilogy of Supreme Court Cases
In the process of refining investigatory criminal procedure, the courts developed
and recognized a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement. Most exceptions,

14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. ME. CONST. art. I, § 5.
16. Ross H. Parr, Note, Suspicionless Drug Testing and Chandler v. Miller: Is the Supreme Court
Making the Right Decisions?, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 241, 243-44 (1998) (citing STEPHEN A.
SALZBURG & DANIEL J. CARPA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 136-362 (5th
ed. 1996)).
17. Id. at 244.
18. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
555 (1976); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). But see New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 352 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (raising concern that the balancing test has
become the rule rather than the exception).
19. See Seventeenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Court
of Appeals 1986 – 1987, 76 GEO. L.J. 521, 534 (1988) [hereinafter Criminal Procedure] (citing T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 340).
20. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
21. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
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however, require a showing of probable cause before a search is allowed.22 Courts
have been willing to dispense with both the warrant and probable cause requirements
when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable cause requirement impracticable.”23 The Court fashioned this special
needs balancing test because “the traditional requirement of a warrant based on
probable cause is not well-suited to searches for purposes as varied as enforcing school
discipline, public safety, and administrative efficiency.”24 However, the special needs
searches are not without some limit: they cannot be for criminal law enforcement and
subsequent prosecutorial evidentiary purposes.25 Thus, if the State can articulate a
compelling interest that outweighs the individual’s privacy expectations, and the
State’s interest is for purposes other than criminal law enforcement, courts may rely
upon the special needs exception to affirm the constitutionality of a search. Consequently, some searches are no longer presumed to be unreasonable in the absence of
individualized suspicion.26
In 1966, the seminal case of Schmerber v. California27 held that a warrant was not
required to perform a blood test on a suspected drunk driver when the search was incident
to the driver’s arrest.28 In Schmerber, the petitioner had been arrested in the hospital
while receiving treatment for injuries he sustained in the accident involving the
automobile he had been driving, and a blood test was taken at the direction of a police
officer. In upholding the search, the Supreme Court reasoned that “the officer . . . might
reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay
necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened ‘the destruction of
evidence.’”29 As such, the Court found that the exigency of the situation and the governmental interest in combating drunk driving outweighed the individual’s privacy interests.30
Schmerber came to stand for the proposition that a warrantless blood test used to detect
a driver’s intoxication would be constitutional so long as there was probable cause to
arrest the driver for drunk driving. In other words, collection of blood alcohol evidence
was deemed permissible in the name of public safety so long as some simultaneous
probable cause existed to indicate that the driver was intoxicated.
As the epidemic of drug and alcohol use escalated to the forefront of the collective
American conscience throughout the 1980s, the Supreme Court found occasion to
dispense with both the warrant and any type of reasonable suspicion requirement in

22. Criminal Procedure, supra note 19, at 538.
23. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
24. SALZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 16, at 299.
25. See id. (explaining that if officials seek to use this evidence in criminal proceedings, they generally
need a warrant or probable cause).
26. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (search without suspicion
may be reasonable if privacy interests implicated are minimal and important governmental interests would
be jeopardized if suspicion required).
27. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
28. The Schmerber Court classified these blood tests as “searches” under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 767. Therefore, because the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Constitution limits these searches. Id.
29. Id. at 770 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
30. Id. at 769-71.
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substance abuse cases. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association,31 the
Court held that even absent a showing of individualized suspicion, the toxicological
testing of railroad employees was constitutional where “special needs” beyond the
normal need for law enforcement were implicated.32 Balancing the interest of the
individual against those of the State, the Court held that the toxicological testing constituted a compelling governmental interest that did not unduly infringe upon the
justifiable privacy interests of employees.33 The majority opinion, authored by Justice
Kennedy, emphasized two factors in support of its holding. First, because the railroad
industry is heavily regulated, railroad employees have a diminished expectation of
privacy.34 Second, because the employees were involved extensively in safety-sensitive tasks, the compelling governmental interest in safety outweighed the individual’s
interest.35 Thus, the Court concluded that “[i]n limited circumstances, where the
privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important government interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement
of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such
suspicion.”36
In Skinner, the Court declined to address the question of whether it would relax
the probable cause requirement when the results of the blood test were going to be used
in future criminal prosecution. Thus far, no court has been bold enough to extend the
Skinner analysis to cover bodily intrusive procedures when such a procedure is used
to garner criminal evidence. In this realm, courts have seemingly adhered to the Fourth
Amendment’s probable cause requirement. However, whether probable cause may be
determined before, during, or after the incident spurring criminal prosecution is a
constitutional interpretation that varies widely among the states.
The Supreme Court has more recently addressed the doctrine of special needs in
Ferguson v. City of Charleston,37 wherein the Court struck down a state hospital’s policy
of screening pregnant women for the presence of cocaine and subsequently reporting
positive results to the police in order to protect the unborn children.38 The Court departed
from its typical practice of analyzing the ultimate goal of a search,39 and for the first time,
overtly considered the immediate purpose of a search.40 The majority articulated the
significant difference between the ultimate goal and the immediate purpose in stating:
“While the ultimate goal of the program may well have been to get the women in question

31. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
32. Id. at 634.
33. Id. at 633.
34. Id. at 627.
35. Id. at 633.
36. Id. at 624.
37. 532 U.S. 67 (2001). Ferguson was decided twelve years after Skinner.
38. Id. at 70-73.
39. Id. at 86-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Prior cases did not distinguish between the immediate
purpose and the ultimate goal of a search. However, the Court always considered the ultimate goal of the
search in its analysis. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995) (identifying the
governmental concern as deterring drug use by school children); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (identifying the
relevant need as regulating the conduct of railway employees to promote the safety of the traveling public).
40. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-83. The threat of law enforcement was “a means to an end.” Id. at 84.
Subsequently, the majority focused on the way in which the defendants achieved their ultimate goal. Id.
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into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs, the immediate objective of the searches
was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to reach that goal.”41 In
determining the purpose of the search in Ferguson, the Court not only evaluated the
context, the specific facts, and all available evidence in the individual case, but also
inquired whether the fruits of the search were used in successive criminal prosecutions.42
The majority appeared overly “[c]oncerned with the extensive involvement of police and
prosecutors in the drafting . . . of the hospital’s search policy” 43 in Ferguson, and thereby
defined the immediate aim of the hospital’s program as the collection of evidence for law
enforcement purposes. As a consequence of Ferguson, searches with the immediate aim
of evidence collection for law enforcement purposes were effectively divorced from
special needs protection. The Court’s decision in Ferguson appeared to signal the end
of liberal applications of the doctrine of special needs, especially when used as
justification for law enforcement searches.
In practice, however, this limitation on the special needs exception has largely
been circumvented. Prosecutors have continued to use evidence obtained in searches
justified by the special needs doctrine in criminal prosecutions.44 Moreover, the states
that have squarely addressed the issue have generally upheld the use of such evidence
in criminal prosecutions—Maine is one.
C. Constitutional Challenges to Section 2522: Maine’s
Application of the Special Needs Doctrine
The expanding number of areas in which the Supreme Court has upheld searches
and seizures conducted without individualized suspicion has raised eyebrows among
state courts. Following the outcomes of Skinner, its predecessors,45 and other cases in
its wake,46 commentators voiced concerns over the erosion of the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.47 Maine, however, has not

41. Id. at 82-83 (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 85-86.
43. Joseph S. Dowdy, Well Isn’t That Special? The Supreme Court’s Immediate Purpose of Restricting
the Doctrine of Special Needs in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1050, 1051 (2002) (citing
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-83).
44. See, e.g., People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 451-53 (Cal. 1998) (upholding search of parolee based
in part on special needs doctrine and allowing evidence obtained to be used in subsequent prosecution);
State v. J.A., 679 So. 2d 316, 320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding evidence obtained during a random
search of a public school student); State v. Bohling, 494 N.W.2d 399, 406 (Wis. 1993) (upholding drug and
alcohol testing of motorists under arrest for drunk driving when there is a “clear indication” that blood will
show evidence of intoxication).
45. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 482 U.S. 868 (1987) (holding that weapons found incidentally and
in plain view while at probationer’s home during warrantless search were admissible in criminal
proceeding); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (holding that evidence found from a warrantless
search of automobile junkyard was admissible); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that
evidence found from a warrantless search of student’s locker at school was admissible).
46. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (holding that
the special needs doctrine justifies State drug testing in certain circumstances, so long as the testing is
reasonable under a balancing test that weighs the State interest against the intrusion on individual privacy).
47. See, e.g., Jon M. Ripans, Comment, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: Sober Reflections
on How the Supreme Court has Blurred the Law of Suspicionless Searches, 25 GA. L. REV. 199, 224-25
(1990).
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attempted to halt this trend. While the Law Court has noted that it is well settled in
Maine that “a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per
se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions,”48 it has not narrowly interpreted those exceptions. Following the Supreme
Court’s holding in Skinner, Maine courts have responded by liberally construing, and
consequently validating, the constitutionality of Maine’s mandatory blood testing
statute49 following a fatal motor vehicle collision.
The Law Court was first asked to consider the impact of Skinner on the constitutionality of Maine’s mandatory blood test law in State v. Bento.50 Scott Bento was
involved in an accident in which the passenger in his car was killed.51 After the
accident, a police officer met with both drivers in the local hospital and administered
breath tests.52 When those breath test results were offered against him in a future
criminal prosecution,53 Bento filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that
the police lacked the requisite probable cause to believe he was under the influence at the
time the test was conducted, and no such probable cause existed.54 The Law Court
handily dismissed this argument by deferring to the intent of the legislature to provide for
the admission of blood-alcohol tests if probable cause could be established by any
information discovered “up to the time admission was sought.”55 In so doing, the Law
Court held that Maine’s statute may not be construed to require that probable cause of
intoxication be established prior to a driver’s submitting to a blood test.56 Further, the
Law Court stated that the statute only required that probable cause be established at the
trial in order for the test results to be admissible.57 The fact that an officer may later find
evidence of alcohol use is significant, for the Law Court avoided the opportunity to
establish a clear standard of what this after-acquired evidence should be to fulfill the
probable cause requirement.58 In crafting its holding in Bento, the Law Court effectively
ignored the warning tolls of the Fourth Amendment bell.
Several years later in State v. Roche,59 the Law Court again rejected a challenge
to the constitutionality of requiring a blood-alcohol test in the absence of probable
cause in a case involving a vehicular death. Wayne Roche, a professional truck driver,

48. State v. Kremen, 2000 ME 117, ¶ 7, 754 A.2d 964, 967 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 219 (1973)) (quotations and citations omitted).
49. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312 (Supp. 1992) replaced by ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, §
2522 (1996).
50. 600 A.2d 1094 (Me. 1991).
51. Id. at 1095.
52. Id.
53. Id. Bento was charged with aggravated OUI and reckless conduct with the use of a dangerous
weapon. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1096. The Law Court stated, “The court must ascertain that probable cause . . . exists. The
statute does not require, by its terms, that the court determine whether probable cause existed at some prior
time (i.e., at the time of arrest or the time the test was conducted).” Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (emphasis added)
58. The Law Court’s only guidance was: “Under this standard, probable cause to believe a defendant
was operating under the influence exists if there is reason to believe that his mental or physical faculties
are impaired by the consumption of alcohol.” Id. at 1096-97.
59. 681 A.2d 472 (Me. 1996).
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overturned his log-hauling trailer on the side of the highway and in so doing fatally
crushed a Department of Transportation worker.60 Roche was taken to a local hospital
following the accident, and upon arrival was administered a blood test by an officer of
the Farmington Police Department.61 The lower court admitted both the results of the
blood test and, as probable cause independent of the blood test result, statements given
by Roche to an investigating officer a few weeks after the accident.62 On appeal,
Roche argued that while exigent circumstances existed in the blood-alcohol testing
situation, probable cause must simultaneously exist in order to administer the test.63
Rejecting Roche’s argument, the Law Court noted that Skinner permitted blood tests
in specialized circumstances without probable cause or on “less than individualized
suspicion.”64 The justification used by the Law Court mirrored that of the Supreme
Court in Skinner,65 which was the special needs exception to probable cause:
The justification for the search is linked to the gravity of the accident as well as the
evanescent nature of evidence of intoxication and the deterrent effect on drunk
driving of immediate investigations of fatal accidents. The State, in effect, conditions
the privilege of driving on every driver’s willingness to submit to a test, if, and only
if, he or she is involved in a fatal or near fatal accident . . . . We believe Skinner
confirms the permissibility of such a scheme.66

Despite its holding, the Law Court recognized that other most other state courts have
treated similar statutes more restrictively in light of Skinner when applied to highway
fatalities.67 At the least, the Law Court revealed its awareness of the fact that Maine
remains in the distinct minority of states that allows for after-the-fact probable cause
to satisfy the constitutional requirement. Regardless, the Law Court dismissed the
prospect of requiring a simultaneous, independent determination of probable cause to
use blood test results following a fatal accident in a future criminal prosecution of the
driver.68 The relatively few subsequent cases in which this issue has been raised have
consistently been decided in line with the Court’s holdings in Bento and Roche.69
Accordingly, under Maine law, the Bento and Roche decisions clearly answered the
question of whether a blood test can be taken following a fatal accident and
subsequently used as evidence in the absence of a warrant, simultaneous determination
of probable cause, or consent solidly in the affirmative.

60. Id. at 473.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 474 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)).
65. The Law Court also secondarily relied upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Michigan Dep’t of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). Id. at 475.
66. Id. at 474.
67. Id. at 475.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., State v. Bradley, 658 A.2d 236, 238 (Me. 1995) (holding that blood tests were admissible
against a Maine driver where probable cause was alone established by a “strong smell of alcohol on his
breath”); State v. Chase, 2001 ME 168, 785 A.2d 702; State v. Alley, 2004 ME 10, 841 A.2d 803.
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III. AN EXAMINATION OF MAINE’S MANDATORY BLOOD TESTING LAW
Maine’s original statute authorizing a routine blood test in circumstances where there
was neither probable cause nor individualized suspicion to believe the driver was
intoxicated was passed in 1992.70 This statute came to life as part of a drastic overhaul
of the Motor Vehicles Title of the Maine Code that occurred in the next legislative year.71
In an effort to increase the enforcement of Maine’s drunk driving laws, the legislature
sought to broaden the class of drivers who could be tested for intoxicants to test drivers
who had been involved in an accident which caused another person’s death. Section 2522
outlines the basic structure and procedure of the mandatory blood testing process while
setting forth the framework for admissibility of those test results in a future proceeding.
In both the original and amended versions of the statute, the first subsection of section
2522 sets forth the requirement of chemical testing in a fatal accident:
1. Mandatory Submission to test. If there is probable cause to believe that death has
occurred or will occur as a result of an accident, an operator of a motor vehicle
involved in the motor vehicle accident shall submit to a chemical test . . . to determine
blood-alcohol level or drug concentration in the same manner as for OUI.72

According to section 2522(1), if the motor vehicle accident resulted in a fatality or the
likelihood of a fatality, the driver of the motor vehicle must submit to a chemical test.
Even if the driver is the person who died at the scene, the testing is mandated
nonetheless.73 In its original form, however, the statute did not specifically mandate
the investigating law enforcement officer to take a blood test of the driver of the motor
vehicle who caused the deadly accident. Instead, the officer could opt for a breath test
or another chemical assessment in lieu of a blood test if deemed appropriate.74 Not
until 2003 did the legislature require that the law enforcement officer administer a
blood test on the driver following such an accident. The sponsor of the legislation,
Representative David Bowles, articulated a need for blood tests in lieu of breath tests
due to “chaotic” accident scenes and the need to determine a driver’s blood-alcohol or
drug content “quickly and accurately.”75 The second subsection of section 2522

70. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312 (Supp. 1992). This title has since been repealed and replaced
by P.L. 1993, ch. 683, § A-2 (effective Jan. 1, 1995), which has since been amended by P.L. 2003, ch. 565,
§ 1 (effective July 30, 2004) (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 29-A, § 2522 (Supp. 2007)).
71. Title 29 was replaced with 29-A in 1993.
72. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2522(1) (1996).
73. See id. § 2522(1)-(2) (Supp. 2007).
74. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2522(2) (1996). The 1996 codification of section 2522(2)
simply reads as follows: “The investigating law enforcement officer shall cause a test to be administered
as soon as practicable following the accident as provided in section 2521.” Id.
75. Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶ 22, 928 A.2d. at 760 (citing Testimony of Rep. David Bowles on L.D.
1803 before the Joint Standing Comm. on Criminal Justice & Pub. Safety 1-2 (Jan. 28, 2004)). He further
stated:
The first law enforcement officer responding to an accident scene is typically faced with a
series of immediate, possibly life saving decisions. . . . One of the officer’s responsibilities
is deciding if a fatality has occurred or is likely to occur as a result of the accident. A
second priority is trying to determine if a surviving driver appears to be impaired either by
alcohol or drug consumption and administering an appropriate test to make this
determination. This is often not an easy determination particularly in the case of drivers
impaired by drug consumption, both legal and illegal. Additionally, the surviving driver
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currently provides:
2. Administration of test. The investigating law enforcement officer shall cause a
blood test to be administered to the operator of the motor vehicle as soon as
practicable following the accident and may also cause a breath test or another
chemical test to be administered if the officer determines appropriate. The operator
shall submit to and complete all tests administered.76

Practically speaking, the investigating law enforcement officer must take a blood test
of the driver as soon as possible following the accident.77 The blood testing has
typically occurred after the driver has been transported to the hospital.78
In addition, and most importantly, the statute also provides that the results of the
aforementioned driver blood tests are admissible at trial in certain circumstances:
3. Admissibility of test results. The result of a test is admissible at trial if the court,
after reviewing all the evidence, whether gathered prior to, during or after the test, is
satisfied that probable cause exists, independent of the test result, to believe that the
operator was under the influence of intoxicants at the time of the accident.79

According to section 2522(3), the blood test results taken in accordance with sections
2522(1) and (2) are admissible at trial if the court determines that evidence gathered
prior to, during, or after the test demonstrates probable cause independent of the test
result that the driver was intoxicated at the time of the accident.80 The legislature
tailored the statute to allow admission of those results in the absence of a warrant,
consent, or simultaneous determination of probable cause only when the State
demonstrates probable cause to believe that the accident has resulted, or will result, in
a fatality.81 In essence, Maine’s statute requires the court to find probable cause in
order for the test results to be admissible; however, the requisite probable cause can
be obtained after the test—and neither the legislature nor a court has articulated any
post-test timeframe under which probable cause evidence must be obtained. Further,
section 2522(3) has not been amended since its original enactment in 1992.82

may, because of the severity of his or her injuries, be unavailable for interview for hours and
perhaps days following the accident. During this time, facts may come to light in the form
of witnesses or forensic evidence that point to a driver’s use of substances which may have
played a contributing role in causing the accident.
Id. (quoting Testimony of Rep. David Bowles on L.D. 1803 before the Joint Standing Comm. on Criminal
Justice & Pub. Safety 1-2 (Jan. 28, 2004)).
76. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2522(2) (Supp. 2007).
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., State v. Roche, 681 A.2d 472, 473 (Me. 1996) (the driver was taken to a local hospital
for examination, whereupon a blood test was ordered by a police officer); State v. Bento, 600 A.2d 1094,
1095 (Me. 1991) (the driver was administered a breath test in the waiting area of the Mt. Desert Hospital’s
emergency room); State v. Chase, 2001 ME 168, ¶ 3, 785 A.2d 702, 704 (a nurse at the hospital took a
blood sample of the driver at the direction of the officer).
79. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2522(3) (1992).
80. Id.
81. Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶ 24, 928 A.2d. at 760 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit., 29-A § 2522(1)
(2006)).
82. Compare P.L. 1993, ch. 683, § 2522(3) with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2522(3) (2006).
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Together, the three subsections of section 2522 reflect the intent of the Maine
Legislature to enact standards for drivers and law enforcement officers in the face of
an accident in which there is probable cause to believe a death has occurred or will
occur.83 The legislature has responded by “narrowly tailoring”84 section 2522 to allow
for the test to be conducted and subsequently admitted at trial due to the “gravity of the
accident” and the “evanescent nature of the evidence of intoxication.”85 Faced with the
statistics of drunk driving, it appears as though the legislature came up with a compromise between a citizen’s right to privacy and the community’s right to be safe on
the roads.
IV. STATE V. CORMIER: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BLOOD TEST
ADMISSIBILITY ABSENT WARRANT, CONSENT, OR A SIMULTANEOUS
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
On the afternoon of May 11, 2003, Richard Cormier was driving a car on Route
85 in Raymond when he was involved in a head-on collision.86 Two occupants of the
other car, Hazen Spearin and Blanche Spearin, died as a result of that collision.87 At
the scene of the accident, the police and paramedics did not smell alcohol on Cormier
or observe anything that would indicate that he was under the influence of alcohol.88
Cormier was transported to a hospital in Portland by ambulance.89 Likewise, the
lieutenant accompanying Cormier in the back of the ambulance found no evidence of
alcohol consumption during the ride to the hospital.90 Without obtaining Cormier’s
consent, the detective informed Cormier that he was there to obtain a blood sample for
the purpose of testing for the presence of alcohol or drugs, and a phlebotomist for the
State was called to the hospital to draw Cormier’s blood.91 During the blood draw, and
upon inquiry, Cormier told the detective that he had consumed one alcoholic drink
earlier in the day.92
The blood sample was sent to the Maine Department of Human Services Health
and Environmental Testing Laboratory, which prepared a report dated May 19, 2003,
indicating that a chemical analysis of the blood sample showed a .08%93 blood-alcohol
content.94 Initially, Cormier was not charged with the commission of a crime. Thirteen

83. Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶ 8, 928 A.2d at 756.
84. Id. ¶ 24, 928 A.2d at 760.
85. Id. (citing State v. Roche, 681 A.2d at 474).
86. State v. Cormier, No. CRIM. A. CR-04-1307, 2005 WL 2725100, at *1 (Me. Super. Ct. Cumb.
Cty., June 3, 2005) (Fritzsche, J.).
87. Id.
88. Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶ 3, 928 A.2d at 755.
89. Id.
90. Cormier, 2005 WL 2725100, at *3.
91. Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶ 4, 928 A.2d at 755.
92. Id.
93. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2411(1-A)(A)(2) (Supp. 2007). In Maine, a person commits
a criminal OUI (“Operating Under the Influence”) if that person operates a motor vehicle while having a
blood-alcohol content of .08% or more. Id.
94. Cormier, 2005 WL 2725100, at *1.
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months after the accident, however, Cormier was charged, after indictment by a grand
jury, with two counts of manslaughter,95 one count of aggravated assault,96 one count
of aggravated OUI,97 and one count of reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon.98
Subsequently, Cormier moved to suppress the results of the blood test in the Superior
Court.99 His primary argument was that the State could not constitutionally take a
blood sample from him absent probable cause, as neither of the responding officers
found any evidence of alcohol consumption after speaking with Cormier at the scene.100
On March 28, 2005, a hearing was held in the Superior Court on Cormier’s motion
to suppress, and a decision was later issued granting Cormier’s motion.101 While the
court acknowledged that the law regarding mandatory testing in cases involving death
serves a “noble understandable purpose”102 and that the prior Supreme Court holding
in Skinner confirmed the permissibility of that scheme, the more recent case of
Ferguson103 required Maine courts to reexamine the constitutionality of section
2522.104 The Superior Court analogized the facts of Cormier’s case to those in
Ferguson and highlighted the impropriety of the State’s law enforcement interest by
stating, “In Ferguson the police were actively involved. In our case the police were
even more extensively involved.”105 Consequently, in granting Cormier’s motion to
suppress the results of the blood test, the Superior Court held that the blood test
evidence was gathered for the improper purpose of law enforcement evidence and thus
violative of the Fourth Amendment in light of the Court’s more recent holding in
Ferguson. The State appealed this decision to the Law Court.

95. Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶ 5, 928 A.2d at 755 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 203(1)(A)
(2006)).
96. Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 208(1)(B), (2) (2006)).
97. Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2411(6) (Supp. 2003)).
98. Id. ¶ 5, 928 A.2d at 756 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 211, 1252(4) (1983 & Supp.
2003)). The incident occurred before the repeal of ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2411(6) (Supp. 2003).
See P.L. 2003, ch. 452, § Q-83 (effective July 1, 2004).
99. Cormier, 2005 WL 2725100, at *2. “By motion dated October 12, 2004, Cormier moved to
suppress all evidence related to the taking of his blood and the results of the blood alcohol test performed
on him on May 11, 2003, and to suppress all . . . statements made by him regarding the consumption of
alcohol on the day of the accident.” Brief of Appellee at 1, State v. Cormier, No. CUM-05-354 (Me. Sup.
Ct. Aug. 14, 2007).
100. Cormier, 2005 WL 2725100, at *3.
101. Brief of Appellee, supra note 99, at 1.
102. Cormier, 2005 WL 2725100, at *4.
103. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
104. See Cormier, 2005 WL 2725100, at *4.
105. Id. Moreover, the court further compared the facts in Ferguson to the case at hand:
Justice Stevens stated for the majority, in terms that are applicable to our case,
“Given the primary purpose of the Charleston program, which was to use the threat of arrest
and prosecution in order to face [sic] women into treatment, and given the extensive
involvement of law enforcement officials at every state of the policy, this case does not fit
within the closely guarded category of ‘special needs.’”
Id. (quoting Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84).
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B. Arguments to the Law Court
On appeal to the Law Court, the State claimed that section 2522, as applied in this
case, was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.106 The State argued that
because section 2522 is part of a “comprehensive legislative scheme to regulate
licensed motor vehicle drivers within the State of Maine”107 reasonable Fourth Amendment intrusions are allowed under the Skinner logic as they further the “compelling
governmental interest of public safety”108 while “minimally intruding on drivers’
privacy interests.”109 According to the State, the public safety concern of removing
impaired drivers from the roads is the compelling government interest “at the heart of
section 2522"110 while criminal prosecution of those drivers is “only a secondary goal
of [the statute].”111 Hence, the State argued that the non-law enforcement purpose still
falls within the “special needs” exception to warrantless, suspicionless search even as
refined by Ferguson.112 The State concluded that the mandated blood test required by
section 2522 is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment in light of the
compelling governmental interest of public safety.113
In response, Cormier argued that section 2522, as applied in the present case, is
primarily a tool of law enforcement and does not fall within the special needs
exception of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.114 Cormier claimed
that the Ferguson decision expanded the constitutional backdrop upon which Roche
was decided in holding that warrantless drug tests conducted for criminal investigatory
purposes were unconstitutional.115 Accordingly, Cormier argued that the immediate
objective of section 2522 was the “generation and preservation of evidence for
potential criminal prosecutions” and thus was no longer constitutionally permissible
under Ferguson.116 He claimed that this was evidenced by the blood sample collection
at the direction of the police, the testing of the sample at a state lab, and the subsequent
turnover of the results to the District Attorney’s Office—while the “civil administrative
mechanism of data collection” was absent.117 Cormier concluded that because section
2522 is “primarily and most immediately a tool of law enforcement” and does not fit
within the “closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless
searches,” Cormier’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated.118

106. Brief of Appellant at 11, State v. Cormier, No. CUM-05-354 (Me. Sup. Ct. Aug. 14, 2007).
107. Id. at 12.
108. Id. at 13.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 15.
112. Id. at 14.
113. Id.
114. Brief of Appellee, supra note 99, at 4.
115. Id. at 11.
116. Id. at 12.
117. Id. at 18. While Cormier does not specify what exactly the “civil administrative mechanism” of
data collection would be, it can be inferred from context that he intended it to be a state policy research and
development center or a state agency bestowed with a mandate to collect and review such data.
118. Id. at 11.
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C. Decision of the Law Court
A majority of the Law Court rejected Cormier’s assertion that his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated, thereby upholding the constitutionality of section
2522.119 In so doing, the majority advanced two major arguments in support of the
statute’s constitutionality. First, the majority upheld the statutory provision primarily
on the basis of the State’s “compelling need”120 to collect data, and then found further
support for its constitutionality in the inevitable discovery rule and the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. In reaching this conclusion, Chief
Justice Saufley, writing for the majority, first examined the statutory context for
mandating blood testing in fatal accidents. The court reasoned that section 2522
reflected the legislature’s recognition of “the need for more complete information
about the involvement of alcohol in serious and fatal accidents.”121 Further, the court
stated that the mandatory testing “adds to the State’s body of knowledge regarding the
effects of driving in Maine while under the influence . . . and allows the Legislature to
be more informed as it shapes policy.”122
The Law Court then examined whether the “unique nature” of section 2522
violated the Fourth Amendment and addressed the inevitable discovery and exigent circumstances exceptions to a warrantless, suspicionless search. Recognizing that a
search authorized by section 2522 “does not fall neatly into either of these exceptions,”123 the majority stated that the Maine Legislature nonetheless recognized the
exigent circumstances of a fatal collision site and “codified a narrow and distinct
application of the inevitable discovery exception” due to the gravity of the accident.124
Accordingly, the majority found that the legislature provided sufficient Fourth Amendment “protections for drivers”125 in crafting section 2522, and admission of the test
results is constitutional so long as the State meets those protection requirements.126

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶ 2, 928 A.2d at 755.
Id. ¶ 36, 928 A.2d at 763.
Id. ¶ 8, 928 A.2d at 756.
Id. ¶ 8, 928 A.2d at 757.
Id. ¶ 18, 928 A.2d at 758. The Law Court explained,
The inevitable discovery exception is usually understood to apply to evidence that would
have been found later, through other legitimate means . . . . The exigent circumstances
exception is ordinarily applicable to a search conducted after determining the existence of
probable cause but before a warrant can be obtained.
Id. ¶ 18, 928 A.2d at 758-59.
124. Id. ¶ 19, 928 A.2d at 759. Thus, the majority stated that “the statute requires the test in this limited
situation because of ‘the gravity of the accident’ and the ‘evanescent nature of evidence of intoxication.’”
Id. ¶ 23, 928 A.2d at 760 (quoting State v. Roche, 681 A.2d 472, 474 (Me. 1996)).
125. Id. ¶ 24, 928 A.2d at 760. The results of mandatory drug and blood-alcohol testing will be
admissible in a criminal proceeding against a driver without violating the Fourth Amendment only when
the State:
(1) presents evidence gathered after the fact demonstrating that, but for the exigencies at the
scene of the collision, probable cause for the test would have been discovered; and (2) the
test would have been administered based on the probable cause established by this
independent lawfully obtained information.
Id. ¶ 26, 928 A.2d. at 761 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 2522(3) (Supp. 2007)).
126. Id. ¶ 27, 928 A.2d at 761.
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While the majority remarked that the “analysis could end there,”127 it went on to
address the applicability of the special needs exception as defined by Skinner and
Ferguson. In balancing the State’s “special need” to obtain information about driver
intoxication against the privacy interests of drivers, the Law Court found that the
State’s special needs, “separate from the general purpose of law enforcement, justify
an exception to the warrant requirement in these circumstances.”128 Moreover, the Law
Court rejected Cormier’s argument that the statute’s primary purpose was one of law
enforcement and instead found that the statute reflected a “joint concern with that of
gathering information for policy development,”129 which thereby distinguished the facts
of Cormier from those of Ferguson. The majority also distinguished Ferguson on the
grounds that section 2522 requires evidence of probable cause even though that
evidence “may be obtained after the administration of the test,” while the hospital
policy in Ferguson did not.130 As such, the Cormier court declared section 2522
constitutional because the warrantless, nonconsensual, and suspicionless search of a
person in the form of a mandatory blood test is reasonable and falls within the special
needs exception—even after Ferguson.
D. The Dissent
Justice Levy, joined by Justice Calkins, attacked the majority holding that section
2522 survives constitutional scrutiny. Remarking that the majority’s rationalizations
of section 2522 “have no support in either fact or law,”131 the dissent balked at the
majority’s primary arguments of the State’s “compelling need” to collect data and that
the search authorized by the provision falls within one of the enumerated exceptions
to the warrant requirement.132 First, Justice Levy asserted that since the Law Court
decided Roche in 1996, the Supreme Court’s refinement of the issue of warrantless,
nonconsensual searches in Ferguson makes the Cormier facts “insufficient to sustain
the searches under the Fourth Amendment’s special needs exception . . . .”133 With
Ferguson in mind, Justice Levy was particularly concerned with the majority’s attempt
to couch the justification of the law in data collection while the “primary practical
purpose of the law is to gather and preserve evidence to be used in prosecutions against
those believed to have been operating under the influence of intoxicants or drugs.”134
He found it likely that the legislature intended for the focus of section 2522 to be one
of law enforcement, pointing to written testimony of the Co-Chairperson of the Maine

127. Id. ¶ 28, 928 A.2d at 761.
128. Id. ¶ 36, 928 A.2d at 763.
129. Id. ¶ 35, 928 A.2d at 763.
130. Id. ¶ 38, 928 A.2d at 764.
131. Id. ¶ 40, 928 A.2d at 764 (Levy, J., dissenting).
132. Id. ¶ 40, 928 A.2d at 764.
133. Id. ¶ 49, 928 A.2d at 767. He stated, “By distinguishing Ferguson and relying instead on the law
of Skinner, the majority returns to the time before such limits were placed on the special needs exception.”
Id. ¶ 46, 928 A.2d at 766.
134. Id. ¶ 50, 928 A.2d at 767. Justice Levy found support for this argument as follows: “[W]hen the
State lab conducts testing on blood samples gathered as a result of this statutory authorization, copies of
the results of those tests are forwarded directly to the District Attorney’s office and the investigating law
enforcement officer, in addition to the Department of Motor Vehicles.” Id. ¶ 50, 928 A.2d at 767 (citation
omitted).

2009]

BLOOD TEST ADMISSIBILITY

257

Highway Safety Commission, who stated, “It is crucial to the prosecution of vehicular
manslaughter cases that blood alcohol levels of the drivers be available as pertinent
evidence.”135
The dissent also criticized the majority’s application of the exigent circumstances
and inevitable discovery rules to section 2522. Rejecting the majority’s assertion that
the inevitable discovery rule is a valid basis to admit the test results of the blood
sample where no simultaneous probable cause exists, Justice Levy quipped at the “lack
of any authority supporting the majority’s expansive reformulation”136 of the rules. He
then compared Maine to other jurisdictions that have ruled on the constitutionality of
similar searches, stating that such searches are upheld “only if they are based on no less
than a reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the
administration of the test.”137 With a reproachful tone, Justice Levy stressed that the
majority’s holding in this case “leads the law into new, uncharted territory in which
probable cause—a cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment—plays a secondary, afterthe-fact role.”138
V. UNCONSTITUTIONAL REASONING WITH A
CONSTITUTIONALLY-DEFENSIBLE RESULT
A. Critique and Consequences of Cormier
As the dissent in Cormier contended, the majority acutely erred when it sustained
the constitutionality of section 2522 on the basis of a combination of the exigent
circumstances and inevitable discovery exceptions to the warrant requirement.139
Certainly, as Justice Levy noted, the court has stepped into territory where only a
handful of states remain140 by upholding the constitutionality of ex post facto probable
cause to justify an earlier warrantless, suspicionless, and nonconsensual search. In

135. Id. ¶ 51, 928 A.2d at 767 (citing An Act to Strengthen Drunk Driving Laws: Hearing on L.D. 2395
Before the Joint Standing Committee on Legal Affairs (1988) (testimony of Albert L. Godfrey, Sr., Maine
Highway Safety Comm.)).
136. Id. ¶ 56, 928 A.2d at 768. He disapprovingly stated that the majority “cites no support for the
notion that courts applying the exception [of exigency] have disposed of the requirement of probable
cause.” Id. ¶ 57, 928 A.2d at 769.
137. Id. ¶ 56, 928 A.2d at 768 (emphasis added).
138. Id. ¶ 59, 928 A.2d at 769.
139. As noted by Justice Levy in his dissenting opinion, the majority seemed to adopt a unique theory
to sustain section 2522's constitutionality: the combined inevitable discovery-exigent circumstances
exception. Id. ¶ 58, 928 A.2d at 769. Notably, this argument was not raised by the State on appeal.
140. Other courts that have ruled on the constitutionality of similar searches have upheld those searches
only if they are based on no less than a reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was intoxicated at
the time the test was administered. See generally United States v. Chapel, 55 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1995);
State v. Steimel, 921 A.2d 378 (N.H. 2007); Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1992); People v.
Duemig, 620 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1980); State v. Aguirre, 295 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1980); State v. Heintz, 594
P.2d 385 (Or. 1979); State v. Dewey, 272 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1978); State v. Graham, 278 So. 2d 78 (La.
1973); People v. Fielder, 485 P.2d 725 (Colo. 1971); State v. Kuljis, 422 P.2d 480 (Wash. 1967); People
v. Lukach, 635 N.E.2d 1053 (Ill. 1994); State v. Curtis, 680 P.2d 1383 (Idaho 1984); State v. Williams, 610
P.2d 111 (Kan. 1980); State v. Bentley. 286 N.W.2d 153 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979); People v. Superior Court
of Kern County, 493 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1972); State v. Davis, 226 A.2d 865 (N.H. 1967); State v. Wolf, 164
A.2d 865 (Del. 1960); State v. Towry, 210 A.2d 455 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965).
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deciding Cormier, the Law Court seriously blundered when it opted not to strike down
section 2522 on the basis that after-acquired probable cause to justify a warrantless
search and seizure is facially unconstitutional. By allowing such clumsy probable
cause to satisfy the constitutional requirement, the court sanctioned unjustly-obtained
evidence to be admitted against the defendant. While conducting a breath, blood, or
urine test on a driver involved in an automobile accident resulting in death may be
reasonable in light of the seriousness and the magnitude of the drunk driving problem
in Maine,141 the state’s interest cannot warrant a suspicionless government intrusion
under the guise of “policy development.”142 Further, requiring simultaneous probable
cause to accompany the nonconsensual, warrantless and suspicionless search
authorized by section 2522 would by no means render Maine an outsider. Other state
courts have found the special needs exception inadequate to support the type of search
authorized by section 2522.143
Although Part II of this Note addressed the special needs exception to the warrant
and probable cause requirements under the Fourth Amendment, it bears repeating that
the Supreme Court has held that the doctrine may be used only when the State has
some special need beyond normal law enforcement activity.144 Additionally, the
Supreme Court’s recent “immediate purpose” inquiry set forth in Ferguson was a
strong signal to curtail liberal applications of the doctrine. Thus, the Supreme Court’s
own interpretation of special needs emphasizes that the exception is applicable only
when the State has some need that extends beyond criminal prosecution of drug laws.
However, the emergent problem in applying the special needs doctrine is plainly
apparent from the holding in Cormier—the majority attempted to cloak the purpose of
section 2522 under “data collection” and “policy development” to circumvent scrutiny
under the special needs analysis. If the concept of “special needs” is to remain a viable
exception to just search and seizure, the Law Court should have squarely addressed the
facts in front of it and struck down the provision to avoid the “end run around the
probable cause requirement.”145 To sustain the constitutionality of statutes like section
2522 on such thinly veiled grounds will serve only to weaken general Fourth
Amendment protections going forward. As the next section argues, the majority
ignored much better grounds to justify such a search.
As addressed in Part III of this Note, section 2522 did not always mandate the use
of a blood test at the scene of a fatality. In its original form, the officer could opt for
a breath test or another chemical assessment in lieu of a blood test if deemed

141. The Cormier majority acknowledged a drunk driving problem in Maine by acknowledging “the
State’s interest in gathering information to assist in addressing the problem of intoxicated driving . . . .”
Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶ 36, 928 A.2d at 736. Undoubtedly, the magnitude of the drunk driving problem
nation-wide has spawned voluminous writings and marshaled numerous efforts to combat the issue. See,
e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVRE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.8(d) (2nd
ed., West Pub. Co. 1987).
142. Id. ¶ 35, 928 A.2d at 763.
143. See generally Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. 2003); McDuff v. State, 763 So.2d 850 (Miss.
2000); King v. Ryan, 607 N.E.2d 154 (Ill. 1992), superceded by statute, 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501.6
(West 1994), as recognized in Fink v. Ryan, 673 N.E.2d 281 (Ill. 1996); Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d
308 (Pa. 1992); Hannoy v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
144. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 US. 305, 311 (1997).
145. Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶ 57, 928 A.2d at 769 (Levy, J., dissenting).
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appropriate.146 Not until 2003 did the Maine Legislature require that the law
enforcement officer administer a blood test on the driver following such an accident.
The sponsor of the legislation articulated a need for blood tests in lieu of breath tests
due to “chaotic” accident scenes and the need to determine a driver’s blood-alcohol or
drug content “quickly and accurately.”147 However, the unstated purpose of requiring
a blood test is that such tests provide much more accurate and reliable data compared
to its predecessors;148 thus, in comparison, blood tests are iron-clad sources of evidence
in a future criminal prosecution of the driver. Accordingly, the statutory change to
section 2522 in 2003 lends further support to the notion that the Maine Legislature’s
true intent in creating section 2522 was one of law enforcement.
As emphasized by the dissent, the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant
requirement has been construed by Maine courts to apply when “there is adequate
probable cause for the seizure and insufficient time for the police to obtain a
warrant.”149 As such, probable cause must exist simultaneously to when the search or
seizure is conducted in order to be constitutional. The Cormier court explained, “The
exigent circumstances exception is ordinarily applicable to a search conducted after
determining the existence of probable cause,”150 yet it did not cite any authority to
support the notion that courts applying the exception have indeed disposed of the
probable cause requirement. Consequently, the result in Cormier affects any driver
arrested for negligent use of a vehicle after an accident in which there is probable cause
to believe a person is killed. For example, if a police officer has probable cause to
believe that a Maine citizen caused an accident that may have resulted in death, the law
enforcement officer may search inside that driver’s body by drawing blood with no
suspicion whatsoever that his driving was impaired by alcohol. The police officer need
not even suspect legal intoxication. Cormier demonstrates that the evidence required
at the time of the search is nonexistent. There is absolutely no evidence in the Cormier
record to support a finding of probable cause to believe that at the time of this accident
Cormier was under the influence of an intoxicant. In fact, the record is to the contrary
and would instead support a finding that he was not under the influence of any
intoxicant at all. There was no erratic driving reported, there was no observation of
slurred speech or glassy eyes, and there was no observation of the odor of alcohol by
the responding officers and ambulance personnel. In fact, no probable cause to believe
Cormier was intoxicated would have been obtained at all had he not mentioned during
the blood draw that had had consumed one alcoholic drink during the day.151

146. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2522(2) (1996). The 1996 codification of section 2522(2) simply
read as follows: “The investigating law enforcement officer shall cause a test to be administered as soon
as practicable following the accident as provided in section 2521.” Id.
147. See Testimony of Rep. David Bowles, supra note 75.
148. See 49 Fed. Reg. 24252-01 (June 12, 1984) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 218, 225) (stating that
blood may be primarily relied upon because it is “the only available body fluid . . . that can provide a clear
indication not only of the presence of alcohol and drugs but also their current impairment effects”); State
v. Reavely, 164 P.3d 890, 892 (Mont. 2007) (“We have never held that a court or jury may assume, as a
matter of law, that a [breath test] result is a reliable representation of a defendant’s BAC within any
particular degree of accuracy.”).
149. State v. Alley, 2004 ME 10, ¶ 15, 841 A.2d 803, 808.
150. Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶ 18, 928 A.2d. at 759 (emphasis added).
151. Id. ¶ 4, 928 A.2d. at 755.
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Pragmatically, many individuals like Cormier may not realize that their after-thefact statements given to investigating officers may be used as probable cause to allow
for the admission of their test results in a future proceeding. In fact, statements made
by the operator charged with a criminal offense up to and including time of that
particular trial may be used as probable cause. The Roche case presented a similar
defendant who was interviewed weeks after the accident at his home by an investigating officer whose subsequent statements were used to establish probable cause. Had
those defendants been aware that any post-accident statements made up to and
including the time of trial were likely to be used to establish probable cause (that was
otherwise lacking at the time of the accident), perhaps they would rethink answering
those questions without an attorney present. A parallel argument could be made that
police officers and investigators may not always be able to easily interpret the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. It is said that application of the probable cause
standard is not “perfectly predictable; there will always be some room for mistake,
even among well-trained officers acting in good faith.”152 Thus, a discordance between
police officers and defendants on the requirements of probable cause may further
restrict the constitutional rights of individuals facing admission of post-accident blood
test results in a criminal prosecution.
When no warrant is obtained, the decision whether the officer has probable cause
to suspect that a driver is under the influence of alcohol is made by the officer herself,
either before, at the time of, or after the accident, rather than by an impartial judicial
officer. Requiring a warrant—and thus probable cause, by extension—to search an
individual’s blood ensures that the decision is made by a magistrate or judge. As
discussed, courts may dispense with the warrant requirement due to the ephemeral
nature of alcohol in the blood, invoking the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement. Nonetheless, expedited procedures for obtaining warrants
demonstrate that this requirement should not be disregarded in such circumstances. 153
The crumbling of the probable cause requirement in Cormier threatens Fourth
Amendment protections in other contexts as well. In the recent Wisconsin case of
State v. Simmons,154 the State of Wisconsin argued that the probable cause requirement
should no longer pertain to strip searches; instead, the lower “reasonable suspicion”
threshold should be applied. While the Wisconsin Court of Appeals declined the
State’s invitation to apply a lower standard, the fact that the Wisconsin court attempted
to dispense with the requirement indicates that states have become headstrong in
applying the “special needs” exception. As an additional consideration, the erosion of
Fourth Amendment protections may ultimately affect the testing of suspects for AIDS.
In Barlow v. Ground, 155 the plaintiff was arrested after a dispute with police officers
during a gay pride march.156 After he bit two of the officers, he was forced to have a
blood sample taken, which was subsequently tested for AIDS.157 Arguably, the only

152. William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 906 (1991).
153. See Robert Brooks Beauchamp, Note, “Shed Thou No Blood”: The Forcible Removal of Blood
Samples from Drunk Driving Suspects, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1139 (1987).
154. No. 90-2699-CR, 1992 Wisc.App. LEXIS 26 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 1992).
155. 943 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1991).
156. Id. at 1134.
157. Id.
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basis for AIDS testing was that the plaintiff was participating in a gay pride march.
The Ninth Circuit held that taking an arrested individual’s blood sample without a
warrant in order to test him for AIDS amounted to a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 158 The Court of Appeals reasoned that the information in the blood was not
evanescent and obtaining a warrant “could neither compound the dangers nor aggravate
the medical consequences,” hence neither Schmerber nor the exigent circumstances
exception applied.159 Thus, because the warrantless search did not fall under a specifically established and well-delineated exception, the police search performed on Barlow
was per se unreasonable.160 Applying Barlow analogously, Barlow, like Cormier, had
been arrested, and the police searched Barlow’s blood without a warrant or probable
cause. If, after Cormier, Maine courts continue to dilute the warrant requirement and
probable cause, a search like that in Barlow may be upheld.
Lastly, the Maine Legislature should amend section 2522 amid such constitutional
concerns. A defective statute such as section 2522 should not have the power to supersede article I, section 5 of Maine’s Constitution. In light of Ferguson, the legislature
should scrutinize the immediate purpose of section 2522 and eliminate any clear links
to law enforcement in order to remain in compliance with the requirements of the Constitution. To accomplish this, the legislature should consider amending the statute161
to permit the previously allowed breath test or other chemical test in lieu of a
mandatory blood test to be administered at the officer’s discretion. In essence, the
legislature should revert back to the 1996 codification of the statute; in so doing, the
legislature would alleviate the obvious law enforcement evidentiary purpose. Most
importantly, and as Justice Levy would argue, the legislature should amend the statute
to prohibit after-the-fact probable cause to justify an earlier, warrantless, suspicionless,
and nonconsensual search. To authorize searches based on such clumsily determined
probable cause renders the statute facially unconstitutional.
B. Same Result, Better Logic: Skinner Could Have Carried the Day
As argued by the previous section, after-acquired evidence and “data collection”
alone should not justify a Cormier-type search. However, at the core there exists a
viable argument that the State’s compelling interest outweighs the minimal intrusion
of a blood test on an individual’s privacy interest. The majority certainly notes the

158. Id. at 1137-39. In articulating why the warrantless search was per se unreasonable, the court wrote:
Even if Barlow was infected with HIV, it is highly unlikely that he could transmit the virus
by biting. Moreover, even if such transmission were a realistic possibility, the officers could
not decrease or increase the risk to their health by forcing an immediate nonconsensual
blood test. . . . It makes no difference to the officers’ health whether Barlow was tested
immediately, without a warrant, or a short time later pursuant to a warrant. The crux of the
exigent circumstances exception is that the officer or others may be harmed if the officer
does not act immediately. In this case, the delay caused by waiting to obtain a warrant could
not have caused or compounded any harm. Therefore, the exigent circumstances exception
does not apply.
Id. at 1139.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, §2522(2) (Supp. 2007).
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balancing of State and individual interests,162 and even acknowledges that the State’s
special needs outweigh the privacy of individual drivers, yet seems too timid to extend
the Skinner logic fully to this case. It felt the need to go further. Inasmuch as it relied
on “data collection”163 and “inevitable discovery”164 grounds instead of a Skinner
analysis alone, the majority left its analysis vulnerable to attack.
The majority misplaces the “special need” in cloaking it as data collection for
policy development165 instead of the extraordinary governmental need to address public
safety and ascribe fault to drunk drivers. The more recent special needs case of
Ferguson was effectively distinguished from the special needs in Cormier, so why did
the Law Court stop there? The Law Court could have effectively argued that the
Maine statute was analogous enough to the regulations at issue in Skinner to justify
blood test administration and subsequent admissibility for protection of the public
interest alone, so long as probable cause evidence was ascertained. Contrary to Justice
Levy’s assertion, since the State retains the right to regulate motor vehicles, drivers do
in fact share a diminished expectation of privacy upon the issuance of a driver’s
license. In accepting a license to drive a car, drivers must abide by State-controlled
motor vehicle laws, or be subject to administrative or criminal punishment should they
choose to disregard it. In Michigan v. Sitz,166 the Supreme Court held constitutional
a Michigan sobriety checkpoint program where searches were conducted without
individualized suspicion.167 In justifying the result, the Court noted that the balance
of the State’s interest in preventing drunk driving and the degree of the intrusion upon
the drivers weighed in favor of the constitutionality of the program.168 A logical
inference of this conclusion is that drivers submit to a diminished expectation of
privacy upon acceptance of a driver’s license if sobriety may be checked randomly,
without any suspicion or probable cause whatsoever. In sum, the State undoubtedly
has a compelling interest in assigning fault where it is due, which in turn has the
tangible benefit of protecting the general public from criminally-intoxicated drivers.
This should have been the basis of the Cormier court’s analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, Maine has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from the
dangers posed by drunk drivers. The subsequent criminalization of such conduct and
the stringent punishments imposed for violation of the laws prohibiting the conduct are,
accordingly, permissive legislative responses to promote the State’s interest. However,
the protections afforded to Maine’s citizens under the Constitution should not be
diminished unless the State can solidly justify its own compelling interest in protection
of its citizens from drunk drivers. But, no matter how compelling the State’s interest,
there must be a logical nexus between an invasion of privacy and securing drunk

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Cormier, 2007 ME 112, ¶ 31, 928 A.2d at 762.
Id. ¶¶ 8, 35, 928 A.2d at 756-57, 763.
Id. ¶¶ 19-23, 928 A.2d at 759-60.
Id. ¶ 35, 928 A.2d at 763.
496 U.S. 444 (1990).
Id. at 455.
Id.
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driving evidence to justify departure from the probable cause requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. The Law Court simply ignored the strong cue from the Supreme
Court to curtail weak state “data collection” excuses to cover the true purpose of law
enforcement. A familiar old adage counsels that the “ends must justify the means.”
In Cormier, however, the “means” of probable cause should be more substantial than
a mere after-the-fact statement given to the officer in the absence of counsel. Under
Maine’s current mandatory blood testing scheme, which permits admission of those
tests at a future criminal prosecution of a driver based on clumsy, after-the-fact
probable cause, the ends simply cannot be justified by such meager means. In the face
of such weak logic, the Law Court would have been on much more solid ground had
it extended Skinner’s reasoning in justifying its result.

